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Abstract. Public – Private Partnerships (PPPs) have become a popular global strategy for 
addressing energy infrastructure challenges. However, the question on which PPPs model 
works best for a particular project in the range of more than a dozen different models, 
remains unsettled by different governments of the world. This study examined the 
necessary conditions for enhancing Public- Private Partnership (PPPs) models for improving 
electricity generation in Tanzania.  Overall, the study findings revealed that, performance of 
PPPs in electricity generation projects was being hindered by elements such as 
unpredictable payments guarantee, skewed contracts for PPAs, lack of transparency and fair 
competition and high costs of electricity. Findings suggests that, the quality of political, 
economic and social institutions, both formal and informal are important for influencing the 
functioning of PPPs projects and its economic outcomes. Also, robust and inclusive 
institutions, the quality of governance structures, laws, rules, regulations, and policies as 
well as the accepted norms and customs, predict the best outcomes. The reverse is equally 
true. In addition, rent seeking activities decrease appreciably as institutional competence 
improves accordingly as well as the capacity of the state to regulate activities of private 
investors.  
Keywords. Public – Private –Partnerships, Independent Power Producers, electricity 
generation projects, Tanzania. 
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1. Introduction 
lectricity services are crucial for economic and social development. 
Yet, over 1.2 billion people still lack access to electricity worldwide. 
Half of those without electricity are in Sub – Saharan Africa 
(European Investment Bank, 2015). Electricity generation in Africa, for 
example, has been a challenge to most countries. As a result of insufficient 
public funds for new power generation and decades of poor performance 
by state utilities, most Sub-Saharan African  (SSA) governments began to 
adopt a new model for their power systems, influenced by pioneering 
reformers such as Chile, Norway, Brazil, the United Kingdom (UK) and the 
United States of America (USA).  The reforms were pushed on by World 
Bank (WB) which was withdrawing funding from state owned projects 
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thus, a number of countries adopted plans to unbundle their power 
systems and introduce private participation and competition. Independent 
Power Producers (IPPs) with long term Power Purchase Agreements 
(PPAs) with the state utility became a priority in overall power sector 
reforms (World Bank, 1993; Eberhard & Gratwick, 2006).  
Although IPPs were considered part of larger power sector reform 
programs in Sub Saharan Africa, the reforms were not far reaching. 
Eberhard & Gratwick (2011) had a view that IPPs for Sub Saharan Africa 
have failed to play a larger and more beneficial role in improving electricity 
generation and the governments and citizens have not benefited in terms of 
affordable and reliable power. 
In Tanzania, to promote private investors participation in electricity sub 
sector a number of legal and policy instruments such as National Energy 
Policy 1992, 2003, 2015 and Electricity Act of 2008; PPPs policy 2009) backed 
by PPPs Act, 2010 as amended in 2018 were put in place.  Despite the Policy 
and legal setting that meant to facilitate private sector participation in the 
Power sector, challenges have remained. For example, the legal, regulatory 
and institutional frameworks are not clear and robust to enable investors 
accept risks over the longer term with some certainty of the framework 
within which these risks are being taken. Institutionally, private investors 
look for certainty of regulation whether it is tax policy, electricity 
regulation for predictable fiscal and monetary policies for a market in 
which contracts are fair and are respected. Dione (2018), argue that clear 
rules of engagement, transparency in bidding and procurement and 
appropriate risk-sharing arrangements between the public and private 
sectors are pre requisite for effective PPPs functioning.  
Experience of public private partnership models applied in Tanzania for 
electricity sub-sector namely management contract and Build Own Operate 
revealed success and failure outcomes. Under management contracts 
experience from TANESCO and NET Group solutions in 2002 to 2006 
Ghanadan & Eberhard, (2007) expressed that; the model was successful 
management and planning in electricity service delivery.  He challenged 
the model that, management contract may improve conditions for 
investment but they do not on their own resolve the question where finance 
for new investment will come from and who is responsible. In that way 
may increase revenue and operations but do not guarantee investment 
outcomes in practice, investment risks and most operational risks remain 
with the public sector.  
The Build Own Operate model as applied in electricity generation 
projects the government granted to independent Power producers the right 
to finance, design, build, operate and maintain electricity generation 
projects. The potential benefit of the model is that there is an element of 
quickly competition of project, investors guarantee a majority portion of 
the capital investment and properly maintain the plants.  Peng, et. al., (2016) 
argued that IPPs with high commercial content were messed up by certain 
elements of corruption, lack of capacity, overestimated capacity charges, 
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high project costs estimates and poor planning. In this vein, this study 
analyzed the quality of power purchase agreement contracts entered 
between the institutions of the state and private sector institutions; their 
respective institutional capacities to monitor and enforce the 
implementation of the signed contracts; quality of incentives offered by the 
state to private sector actors to transfer technology, managerial skills, 
financing and innovations as well as the modalities of sharing agreed 
mutual costs and benefits during the entire period of the contract.  
 
2. Literature review 
2.1. Structures of public – private partnerships models 
Public – private partnerships differ in terms of the models and 
structures being applied from country to country or between projects.  
Their context, purpose and perspective may as well differ depending on 
the arrangement between parties involved and the pattern of 
implementation (Mouraviev & Kankadse, 2012; ONG, 2003).  The terms of a 
PPP are typically set out in a contract or agreement to outline the 
responsibilities of each party. PPP models have been also analyzed from 
different perspectives depending on the arrangement as seen from different 
scholars and sources such as UNESCAP (2008); Jeffares, et al. (2009); Kwak, 
et al. (2009); Tanzania PPP policy (2009); United Nations (2011); UNDP 
(2015). The most common models in utilities are discussed.  
Management Contracts: They are normally of short duration ranging from 
3-5 years of operations arrangement with a limited transfer of 
responsibilities and risks to the private operator (Fall et al., 2009).  Both the 
private sector risk and financial and commercial risks remain relatively low 
and ownership remains with the public sector. Although the ultimate 
obligation for service provision remains in the public sector, daily 
management control and authority is assigned to the private partner or 
contractor. The main advantages of management contract are in form of 
operational gains that result from the private sector management without 
actually transferring assets to the private sector. In terms of weaknesses, the 
split between the obligation of services and management on one hand, and 
the financing of expansion planning could inhibit the private sector from 
enjoying the autonomy or the authority thus not able to make meaningful 
change. Similarly, being paid a portion of profits may encourage the 
private sector to inflate the reported achievement or deficit maintenance of 
the system to increase profits (ADB, 2008). Ghanadan & Eberhard, (2007) 
expressed that; management contract is successful if there is effective 
policy, management and planning in the sector as a whole.   
Build-Own-Operate (BOO): Under BOO model, the government grants 
the right to finance, design, build, operate and maintain a project to a 
private entity, which retains ownership of the project. The private entity is 
not required to transfer the facility back to the government. BOO guarantee 
a majority portion of the capital investment required. Gratwic et. al. (2005) 
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addressed that, BOO mitigated project risk, by ensuring that developers 
would properly maintain their plants. The model is disadvantageous as 
ownership of strategic assets such as nuclear power plant is likely to fall 
under private and foreign firms.  
Build Own Operate Transfer (BOOT): Under this model a private entity 
receives a concession from the private or public sector to finance, design, 
construct, own, and operate a facility stated in the concession contract. 
Legally own and operate such infrastructure assets for a defined period 
and then transfer the assets to the government after a defined period of 
time. BOOT model minimizes the public cost for infrastructure 
development and reduces public debt. Yumurtaci et. al., (2006) pointed out 
that BOOT facilitates great incomes than investment and operation cost to 
the developer and shift of capital abroad.  
Design-Build-Operate (DBO): Under this model, the government contracts 
with the private partner to design and build a facility in accordance with 
the requirements set by the government. After completing the facility, the 
ownership of the facility remains with the public sector while the private 
partner operates the facility according to public performance requirements. 
Salifu (2015) expressed that to ensure DBO achieved its desired objective 
there should be an improvement in the regulatory capacity and processes 
to make it more systematic and transparent.  
PPPs models have been applied in different countries in various 
infrastructure projects and typically practiced as the optimal strategy in the 
electricity sector. It becomes imperative to describe how they are typically 
practiced in electricity sector and compare to other best experience from 
different governments. 
Nandjee (2006) in the study of electricity generation in Cotdivour 
reported that due to delays the project took about 4 years to come into 
operations. The bidding and costs of the project was high than for 
traditional government procurement processes. An expensive tender and 
negotiation process, including higher contract transaction costs paid to 
legal and accounting firms, can neutralize any savings made in design and 
construction phases. The argument was close to Colverson & Perera, (2012) 
who express that, complicated and lengthy tender process of PPPs contract 
and negotiation periods are often more complex and protracted due to the 
nature of the multi party, financially intricate, and long agreement terms 
inherent in the relationship. 
Nsasira, et al. (2013) focused on the use of Public Private Partnerships 
(PPPs) as a strategy to address deficiencies in the energy sector of Uganda 
in order to remedy the power generation shortage in the country. They 
presented two case experiences of PPP in the energy generation of Uganda 
and lessons learnt. A review of the two case studies suggests a number of 
learning points related to involvement of stakeholders, need for 
government monitoring of the Public Private Partnership contracts and 
fostering of a win-win outcome. The paper highlights that successful 
implementation of a PPP depends to a large extent, on the development of 
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capacity, sound legal procedures, agreements, and contracts that clearly 
define the relationship between government agencies and private firms.  
Eberhard, et. al., (2018) in a review of private investment in Tanzania’s 
power generation sector addressed that poor contracts in Tanzania resulted 
into costly deals and disputed contacts with a large drains on time and 
resources. They acknowledged that IPTL contract was the most expensive. 
Comparing Songas Limited to IPTL contracts they concluded that IPTL 
power costs six times more than Songas’ power. They further found that 
beyond technical considerations, it is apparent that such a large price 
difference between the two is primarily due to a lack of competition and 
the disputes that have affected IPTL procurement. Additionally, the study 
cited Symbion Tanzania as another powerful example of a deal initially 
contracted in a nontransparent manner, with costly and disruptive 
outcomes. The Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Agency has been 
given the mandate to reject unsolicited proposals, like IPTL, that are not 
within the Power Sector Master Plan and are not financially viable. 
However, negotiated deals persist, and non-competitive procurement.  
Eberhard et.al., (2016) in the study of Independent Power Projects in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, lessons from Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania 
and Uganda revealed that; although the typical IPP structure is understood 
as a privately sponsored project with limited recourse project  financing, 
some IPPs in Sub-Saharan Africa do not follow this exact model. Instead, 
the government may hold some portion of equity, bringing IPPs closer to a 
model of PPPs than that of traditionally conceived IPPs. The study findings 
specifically for Tanzania indicated that, what has prevented Tanzania from 
harnessing its domestic resources in an economically efficient way is the 
sector’s structure and institutions characterized by poor organization and 
governance structures, vertically integrated state-owned utility and the 
prominence of nontransparent deals.  
 
3. Conceptual framework 
The conceptual framework of this study is primarily concerned with 
understanding of the possible conditions for enhancing public-private 
partnership models to be effective in improving electricity generation in 
Tanzania. The conceptual framework reflects possible variables which 
address and predict the result of the study in such a way that at the end of 
the process, they will be possible factors that influence performance of PPP 
models for improving electricity generation. Figure 1 gives details of a 
planned effective public – private partnership model in the electricity 
sector.   
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A. Actors
Government and 
relevant institutions
Private sector actors
(Domestic/Foreign)
Civil society/
organization community
PPP Models
i. Management Contract
ii. Service Contract
iii. Lease/Affermage
iv. Concessions
v. BOT/BPP
vi. DBO
vii. Joint Ventures
Interests
a. Public-TANESCO
Adequate, reliable and 
affordable electricity
b. Private-IPPs
Earn profits and ease 
access to customers
C. Contested 
Issues
i. Policies, legal and 
regulatory frameworks
ii. Institutional structure
iii. Implementation of 
contracts, policies, rules 
and regulations
iv. Capacity of both 
public and private
v. Monitoring and 
compliance
3. Predatory State
Corrupt state institutions
Weak policies, lousy 
contracts, rules and 
regulations
Weak enforcement
Corrupt private sector
B. Intervening 
Variables
1. Development State
Development plans, 
visions, policies and 
programs
Effective, responsive 
institution, rules and 
regulations
Competent private sector
Competent civil society
2. Laissez-faire state
Pocket of robust 
institutional
Laissez-faire institutions
Weak implementation of 
contract laws, policies and 
regulations
Infiltrations by private 
sectors
D. Possible 
Outcome
Best Possible Outcomes
Meet national target 
10,000MW by 2025
Projects and programs 
implemented
Technology and skills 
transfer
Win-win outcomes
Institutional maturation
Mixed Possible 
Outcomes
Win some and lose some 
few pockets of effective 
institution
Weak institution 
predominates
Worst Possible Outcomes
Ineffective institutions
Zero sum game for host 
country
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Framework Suggesting Effective Public Private Partnership for 
Improving Electricity Generation 
Source: Author’s construct, 2018/2019 
 
The conceptual framework of this study was guided by the argument 
that, the nature of the state, society and institutions influences the quality of 
the regulatory outcomes. Following Routley (2012) it is posited that, there 
three types of state: the developmental state; Laissez faire state and 
predatory state. The first state category has robust developmental visions, 
plans, and strategies. With a developmental ideology, it mobilizes the 
domestic and foreign firms to pursue its state objectives. It has the capacity 
to negotiate and implement win-win contracts with the private sector 
rewards the working class and provides social services to the public at 
reasonable prices. Ultimately, the development success enhances the 
political legitimacy. Similarly, the laissez faire state has pockets of robust 
institutions and pockets of lousy and ineffective institutions. It may 
negotiate robust contracts and agreements with the private sector and civil 
society but fail to implement them thus reflecting its inherent institutional 
weakness. The framework predicts suboptimal performance over a long 
haul. 
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The third category of the state as posted by Routley (2012) is a predatory 
state. It reflects the greed of the ruling class and private sector. Its rules are 
incapable of developing and nurturing strong institutions capable of 
transforming primitive economies, state and society. It is the extreme 
opposite of the developmental, accountable and responsible institutions of 
the first state category. It is non-developmental by all intents and purposes. 
It is corrupt, non-transparent and with exclusive institutions that preside 
over economic and political mismanagement. The financial system of this 
state predicts economic and social decay as well as political insecurity. 
PPPs models for electricity generation influenced by the public sector 
control the decisions making structures, the political and social goals while 
the private sector contributes to the process by its innovation capabilities, 
knowledge, technology, management, funds and networks. Stakeholders in 
the other side include civil society, financiers, faith based organizations and 
local community living along power plants. All of these have a significant 
contribution in enhancing effective PPPs models in the energy sector. 
 
4. Methodology 
The study was conducted in twelve (12) institutions that is four (4) 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs), eight (8) public and private 
institutions, and local community neighboring power generation projects in 
five regions of Tanzania mainland namely, Dar es Salaam, Iringa, Ruvuma, 
Kilimanjaro and Dodoma. The study used exploratory and analytical 
research designs to explore the variables and employed mixed approaches 
that consist of both qualitative and quantitative techniques for collecting 
and analyzing data.  
The target population of this study based on the estimated number of 
officials with PPPs expertise and working on power sector in each of the 
companies, public and private institutions such that in every entity there 
are at least ten (10) officials making the total of 120 officials and the 
assumption that each power plants has at least twenty (20) people living 
along the power generation plants making a total of 80 people making 
estimated number of the targeted population was about 200 people for all 
of the categories. The study used the sample population instead of the 
whole population. Therefore, the selected sample of respondents was 66 as 
computed by using Yamane (1967) formula. Hampawaye, (2008) defines 
the sample as the representative of the target population which should be 
at least 10 percent of the target population. In this regard, the sample size 
for the study was obtained using the formula adopted from Yamane, (1967) 
which is delivered as follows: 
 
𝑛 =
𝑁
1 + 𝑁(𝑒)2
 
Where  
n  = the sample size 
N  = the population size 
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e   = 0.1 is sampling error expected to produce the desired level 
of precision. 
There is confidence level of 99% 
Therefore n= 200/ 1+200 (0.1)2 
n=66 respondents 
 
The respondents were selected as follows.  There were two (2) officials 
from Commercial and Compliance department of Songas Limited; Two (2) 
officials from the Office of Factory Executive Director of TPC Limited, Two 
(2) Senior Officials from Operations management of Mwenga Hydro 
Company Limited and four (4) from official from Operations and 
management at the main office of Tulila Hydroelectric Limited. 
Additionally, the sample was also drawn from public entities including 
four (4) officials from the section of Planning and research (1), generation 
(2) and Commercial services (1) representing TANESCO;  also there were 
Two (2) officials from the Department of Electricity Generation and 
Markets of EWURA; Two (2) officials from the department of Policy and 
Planning (1) and department of Generation (1) of the Ministry of Energy. 
Furthermore, the sample was taken from four (4) officials from PPP 
Division of the Ministry of Finance and Planning,; Two (2) from Policy 
Department of the Tanzania Private Sector Foundation; Three (3) from the 
Department of research and Planning of the Tanzania Investment Centre; 
Six (6) from the Energy and mineral committee of the parliament of 
Tanzania; and One two (2) from the World Bank Group. Lastly, total of 
twenty-nine (29) community members living adjacent to the selected power 
plants were selected to participate in the study. Therefore, the selected 
sample of respondents was 66 but the actual sample used in the study was 
48 equivalent to 72 percent of the selected sample, thus lead some gap 
between them. The reason behind was that some officials were in meeting 
out of their work station, others were busy with leadership issues and 
office works. Also, it was noticed that some officials had no time to while 
others were busy with parliamentary sessions leadership and some excused 
that are not conversant and responsible for PPPs issues. The study collected 
data through the administration of semi- structured questionnaires, 
interviews schedule, documentary search and observations.  
 
5. Findings, analysis and discussion 
5.1. Overview of the selected companies involved in electricity 
generation  
Respondents were asked to indicate the profile of their respective 
companies using both close and open-ended questions. Also, documentary 
review aided to support the required information for analysis. Table 1 
provides the summary of the private and public organizations involved in 
electricity generation.  
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Table 1. Summary of Basic Information of Selected Companies Involved in Electricity 
Generation in Tanzania 
Company 
Description
SONGAS Limited TPC Power Plant Tulila Hydro Co.Ltd Mwenga Hydro Co.Ltd TANESCO
Year of 
establishment
2001 1930  registered in 1973 2010 2012 1931  registered  in 2002 
Location Dar es Salaam Kilimanjaro Ruvuma Iringa Dar es Salaam
Registration status Private Private Private Private Public
Installed capacity 
(MW)
180 17 5 4 1,382
Partnership model BOO BOO BOO BOO BOO
Power purchase 
Agreement duration
15  years 20  years 15 years 20 years
 Infinite (Single  buyer  
and  electricity  
distributor)
Work force  size 151 3000 25 31 7000  
Source: Field Survey, 2018/2019 
 
As it is revealed in Table 1 the selected electricity generation companies 
are not homogeneous. They differ in terms of size, ownership and numbers 
of years engaged in power purchase agreements. The profile of each 
company shows that the companies are small size projects. This confirms 
what Sawe et. al. (2017) who argue that the institutional, policy and 
regulatory framework for the energy sector in Tanzania has been reformed 
with specific initiatives to encourage private participation in small power 
production and distribution. Overall, the study findings reveal two types of 
ownership of the private power projects, some are either owned fully by 
the private company, public or both private and public ownership 
shareholding. It was noted that all the power generating companies were 
working under Build Own Operate (BOO) model. This implies that Power 
Purchase Agreements set out obligations relating to the sale and purchase 
of the power generated, the required design and outputs and operation and 
maintenance specification for the power plant. 
 
5.2. Motives and obligations behind the companies’ engagement in 
electricity production 
The major motive of all the electricity generating companies were 
established for commercial purposes with some electricity charges and 
therefore, in doing so, realize some profit. In their entirety, private power 
projects’ main objective and motivation for electricity generation lie in 
commercial purposes. As argued by Gatwick et. al. (2006) conditions that 
have pressed for the use of Independent Power Producers include 
international donor priorities as the World Bank made electricity sector 
reforms a precondition for lending. Based on the findings of this study, it is 
evident that the main objectives of IPPs are to make profit.  In this regard, 
Mishra (2018) remarked that, in generic terms, what one looks for in a 
partnership is a win-win situation. He insists that one must enter into a 
contract where both parties make money. This argument implies that 
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partnerships in power generation should be guided by win – win situation 
to all stakeholders. 
 
5.3. Procurement modality of selected IPPs  
This study noted that, for Tulila Hydroelectric Limited, Mwenga Hydro 
Limited, and TPC Limited the procedure for these independent energy 
generators were procured using direct negotiations under Small Power 
Projects (SPP) framework passed by the government in 2004. Under this 
framework, private producers submit their proposals under open and 
transparent way where then contracts are signed. For Songas Limited, the 
contract was signed under direct negotiations with the government to 
generate and sell electricity to TANESCO on sale of capacity and energy 
bases.  During the interview session, one of the respondents commented on 
the model of procurement that it was not effective as it lacked competition. 
He noted:   
“The challenge is lack of competition in getting potential partners 
because private power generators were secured through agreements 
and signing memorandum of understanding which was not 
transparent and witnessed,” he said. The issue of capacity charge is 
not put clear for many stakeholders from public sector and is 
benefiting the private producers. Also the high electricity cost sold to 
TANESCO from IPPs is the challenge and causes the government to 
subsidize TANESCO in order to sell electricity to customers at low 
price. The solution lies in adhering to the laws he mentioned PPP Act, 
Electricity Act 2008, Procurement Act and other available sectored 
policies and laws. The concept of capacity charges in electricity 
generation projects should be sensitized to law makers and decision 
makes from public side.” (Interview Session Number 4 conducted on 
27/11/2018 in Dodoma). 
This concern implies that the basic condition should be enhancement of 
competition system in procuring potential investors, fair and transparent 
bidding process. Therefore, the regulator should issue indicative prices that 
will attract electricity generation and which are beneficial to both parties. 
Lack of competition in procuring IPPs projects has been pointed out as a 
challenge to successful PPPs as argued Chowdhury & Charoengam (2008) 
who found that a competitive bidding framework is necessary to give 
credibility to IPPs and that government should provide payment 
guarantees to stand behind the state utilities’ obligations.   
 
5.4. Electricity market structures 
In Tanzania, TANESCO is the main buyer (off taker) of the generated 
electricity from Independent Power Producers. This national utility buys 
and sells electricity to customers and collects bills for repayment to the 
IPPs. The purchasing agency transmits to distribution companies which 
have a monopoly relationship with the final consumer (URT, 2014). Details 
of the ESI Reform Strategy and the Roadmap 2014 -2025 addressed 
different models in electricity sub-sector markets. They include single 
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buyer as opposed to wholesale competition and retail competition. This 
study found that among the four selected IPPs projects, only Songas Ltd 
and Tulila were selling electricity generated to TANESCO as the only buyer 
(off taker). For TPC limited electricity generated was primarily used to the 
sugar factory that is for internal consumption at 80 percent and only 
20percent excess is sold to TANESCO.  Mwenga Hydro Ltd had the license 
to sell electricity to TANESCO and community/villages surrounding the 
electricity plant. Lovei, (2000) argue that the single buyer model preserves a 
key role for the sector Ministry in decisions on investments in generation 
capacity and for the state owned electric company in the sector’s financial 
affairs and thus tends to be favored by these influential players. However, 
among the disadvantages mentioned is that the single buyer model 
hampers the development of cross border electricity trade by leaving it to 
the single buyer, a state-owned company without a strong profit motive.  
 
5.5. Risks involved in power production 
The study observed that each organization in the partnership was facing 
its risks with some having common risks depending on the technology 
used in electricity generation. The common risk that was identified came 
out from the power plants visited (TPC Limited, Mwenga Hydro Limited, 
Tulila Hydroelectric Limited, Songas Limited and TANESCO which was 
the issue of lack of guarantee on timely payment and ageing transmission 
infrastructures that were disconnected from the grid for maintenance and 
repair hence plants could not produce electricity. The following quote from 
one of the respondents illustrates this situation: 
In my opinion, the basic risk is made of those issues that may cause 
the specific projects not to generate electricity and connect to the 
national grid. For example, delay in timely servicing and maintenance 
of generation machines and infrastructure of the power plants. Also, 
TANESCO has been delaying in paying electricity bills billed to it by 
power producers. This may make private producers fail to run the 
plants and even fail to timely service the machines. (Interview Session 
Number 1 conducted on 21/11/2018 in Ruvuma). 
Another risk identified from IPPs using hydroelectric technology was 
the environment issue such that drought during summer seasons was the 
challenge. The following statement illustrates this argument: 
We have the risk when it comes to river environment and the slowdown of 
the volume of water in the river.  However, we are able to bear the risk and 
we have a joint committee with government formed to mitigate the risk and 
sensitize stakeholders on environment protection. (Interview Session 
Number 2 conducted on 26/11/2018 in Iringa). 
Based on the study findings, risks like drought seemed to be difficult to 
bear like low water levels in the river during summer seasons hence 
affecting the generation of power activities. Again, the market risk was 
associated with the risks of investment arising from a mismatch between 
power generated and actual market demand that had been undersupply. 
As commercial entities, non-payment for services rendered would have a 
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negative consequence on operational capacities of IPPs as they need money 
to meet staff settlements, to service their loans and overall to meet 
shareholders expectations. These findings are consistent with Kabanda 
(2014) who identified risks such as hydrology risk, market, political, and 
natural forces. Also, Zunguze (2016) identified risks involved in power 
production including; climate, repayment risk, lack of technical and 
financial capacity, change of political and economic environment and 
market demand risks among others.  
  
5.6. Regulatory and institutional framework for electricity 
generation projects 
According to Mwenechanya, (2013), and the GoT instrument of 2016; the 
electricity sub-sector is handled by the government under for key 
institutions namely the Ministry of Energy (ME), TANESCO, Rural Energy 
Agency (REA) and Energy and Water Utility Regulatory Authority 
(EWURA) with their respective Boards of Directors.  Ministry of Energy, 
oversees the power and gas sectors in Tanzania. It is mandated with 
developing energy resources and has the power to develop and review 
government policies in the energy sector. At the industry level, TANESCO 
and private power producers are responsible for electricity generation 
though TANESCO dominates the sector. The structure and oversight of 
electricity sector in Tanzania is presented in Figure 2. 
 
MOF- PPPs  Oversight and Policy 
Implementation
TANESCO BOARD OF DIRECTORS REA BOARD OF DIRECTORS EWURA BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Governance, strategic direction and 
acountability
Governance, strategic 
direction and acountability
Governance, strategic direction 
and acountability
Power Developers
IPPs, SPPs and EPPs    PPAs
TANESCO (Generation, Transmission 
&Distribution) and PPA Payments
REA(Facilitate Developers of 
rural electricity) EWURA (Regulatory Oversight)
ME- Electricity Sector Oversight and Policy 
Implementation
CUSTOMERS
 
Figure 2. Summary of the Structure and Oversight of Electricity Sector. 
Source: Field Survey, (2018/2019) 
 
From the figures 2, and the literature reviewed, EWURA is responsible 
for the technical and economic regulations of electricity. TANESCO is the 
single vertically integrated national utility that is responsible for generation 
and fully owns transmission and distribution systems including the 
National grid. TANESCO also purchases electricity generated by a number 
of Independent Power Producers (IPPs). The Rural Energy Agency (REA) 
as another autonomous body under the ME is responsible for the support 
and facilitation of improved access to modern energy in rural areas through 
running training programmes, financing rural grid expansion, and partially 
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financing rural energy projects. The National Energy Policy (NEP), (2015) 
acknowledges the challenge toward implementing regulatory issues hence 
the need to review legislations and overlapping roles and functions of 
institutions.  This is consistent to the argument by Eberhard, et. al., (2016) 
that the state utility TANESCO takes part in sector planning while 
simultaneously retaining an interest in building its own new power 
stations and also dealing with Private power producers.  
 
6. Power generation performance: Overview 
The performance of the power generation provides the evaluation of 
both private and public sector generation capacity to meet the government 
goal of 10,000MW by 2025.  As of 2019, Tanzania’s total installed generation 
capacity was 1,600MW where as a total of 20 electricity generation projects 
under Independent Power Producers (IPPs) were being operated with a 
total capacity of 408 MW (EWURA, 2019).  The electricity policy of the year 
1992 and 2003 lifted TANESCO's monopoly in power generation with the 
intention of attracting private sector investment to complement the 
TANESCO-owned generation capacity but private power generation 
capacity have remained meagre compared to the state utility performance.  
Table 2 shows the trend of Independent power producers and 
TANESCO for the period 2010-2018. 
 
Table 2. Electricity generation by IPPs Vs TANESCO 2010-2018 
Category 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010
IPPs 1,533,495.5         1,582,620.9         1,837,516.7         2,567,155.8         2,150,255.0         2,643,726.9         2,563,253.5         2,106,480.7         1,569,401.5         
Public 5,723,331.6         5,425,156.0         5,153,007.8         3,830,931.6         4,071,351.6         3,267,615.6         3,123,649.7         3,034,721.2         3,700,149.6         
Total 7,256,827.1         7,007,777.0         6,990,524.5         6,398,087.4         6,221,606.6         5,911,342.5         5,686,903.3         5,141,201.8         5,269,551.1         
% of IPPs  to 
total 
generation
21.1                     22.6                     26.3                     40.1                     34.6                     44.7                     45.1                     41.0                     29.8                     
Units Generated - MWh
 
Source: TANESCO, 2019 
 
The trend of power generation shows that the contribution of the IPPs in 
electricity generation has slowed down from 29.8 percent in the year 2010 
to 21.1 percent in 2018.  The Electricity Act (2008), which is the principal 
law, entails far-reaching reforms, including the unbundling of the utility, 
TANESCO, into separate, autonomous units for generation, transmission 
and distribution, and the establishment of a system operator to administer 
a grid code. The law opened the generation and distribution segments to 
industry players though TANESCO has remained vertically integrated. 
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6.1. Electricity generation performance of the selected power 
projects 
The analysis focusing on the four selected generation companies under 
this study (Songas Limited, TPC Limited, Tulila Hydro Electricity Limited 
and Mwenga Hydro Limited and TANESCO shows that, there has been a 
significant contribution of electricity generated by IPPs to the national grid 
since 2010 to 2018. Table 3 Shows individual capacity of power generated 
by each of the selected IPPs and TANESCO from 2010 to 2018. 
 
Table 3. Individual Capacity of Power Generated by Each of the Selected IPPs and 
TANESCO from 2010 to  2018 
2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010
Mwenga Min Hydro           16,830                16,337                 19,269                 16,654               22,900                  2,595                       -                         -                         -   
Tulila             3,806 18,384              15,039               1,536                 -                   -                    -                    -                    -                    
Songas      1,468,201           1,465,012            1,349,428            1,384,367          1,383,813           1,313,925           1,465,060           1,312,020           1,442,203 
TPC           14,594 20,725              20,250               12,757               5,483                5,225                14,163              13,141              6,148                
Total IPPs 
Generated MW/h
1,503,431     1,520,458         1,403,986          1,415,315          1,412,196         1,321,745         1,479,223         1,325,161         1,448,350         
TANESCO 5,723,332     5,425,156         5,153,008          3,830,932          4,071,352         3,267,616         3,123,650         3,034,721         3,700,150         
Total IPPs and 
TANESCO 
Generated MW/h
7,226,763     6,945,614         6,556,993          5,246,246          5,483,548         4,589,360         4,602,873         4,359,882         5,148,500         
Name of the Plant
Annual Units Generated - MWh
 
Source: Field Survey, (2018/2019)  
 
The analysis basing on Table 5.5 above shows TANESCO's monopoly in 
power generation with meagre contribution from IPPs. The Electricity Act 
(2008), opened the generation and distribution segments to industry 
players though TANESCO has remained vertically integrated. 
 
6.2. Capital investment in power generation   
The selected IPPs demonstrates that as of the year 2018 the total capital 
investment was about US$ 352 million equivalents to Tanzania shilling 
901.9 billion (ERT. 1 US$= Tsh 2,300). In the distribution Songas Limited 
investments was UD$ 321, TPC Ltd invested US$ 15 million, Mwenga Ltd 
invested US$ 11 million and Tulila US$ 6 million. The investment of US$ 
352 million equivalents to Tanzania shilling 901.9 billion for four IPPs 
under study are relatively minimal and far from the required investment as 
the Ministry of Energy (ME) forecasts per capita electricity consumption 
increase of over 500 percent between 2010 and 2035 whereas meeting this 
demand will require investment of over US$40bn in power generation. The 
state utility had invested about 797.4 US$ million in the year 2018 which 
confirms that the government has been the primary financiers of electricity 
generation projects. The government has shown commendable initiatives in 
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its thrust to invest in new massive electricity generation project of about 
2,115 MW at Mwalimu Nyerere Hydroelectricity in Rufiji which up to its 
completion in 2022 will cost about 6.2 trillion shillings. To this end if 
further partnership will engage the likelihood to meet the national target of 
10,000 MW will be achieved. 
The minimal financing from private investors has been confirmed in the 
details of regulatory performance report on electricity sub sector for the 
year ended 30th June, 2017 issued by EWURA stating that even though the 
authority has developed regulatory tools to attract private investment in 
the electricity sub- sector, the pace of investment is not sufficient to meet 
the rapid growing demand. The Authority, in collaboration with the 
Government and other stakeholders is working on strategies to increase 
electrification including seeking guidance from MOE on implementation of 
the competitive bidding framework.  The study findings further show that, 
PPP project funding has been limited by the infancy of the local financial 
sector. This finding is also addressed in Suman, (2016) for the case of 
Bangladesh.  In the context of this study, during the interview, it came out 
that the infancy of the local financial sector to execute project finance are 
the challenge. It is a fact that energy infrastructure projects require huge 
capital for investment that most local commercial banks are currently 
unable to give. Banks and institutional investors such as pension funds are 
limited with regard to the amount of financing they can avail for energy 
projects. 
 
6.3. Electricity prices  
In the year 2018, the average cost per kilowatt-hour sold to TANESCO 
was TZS 191.0 (approximately US$ 0.08) while the cost sold to customers 
was TZS 270.0 (approximately US$ 0.12) based on average 2018 exchange 
rates. According to the report of TANESCO and details of PPAs, it is 
revealed that for Tulila,, Mwenga and TPC the price of buying electricity 
from December up to July of every year was between TZS 182.80 Kw/h. to 
TZS 185.9 Kw/h. and for the months from August up to November the 
price is Tsh243.73 kW/h . The price was set based on the size of these power 
plants and technology adopted in electricity generation. During the study, 
respondents were asked to comment on the current price of TZS 270.0 per 
kilowatt-hour using close ended questions with four options as 
summarized in Table 4. A total of 48 respondents including six (6) from 
Independent Power Producer and sixteen (16) from public and private 
institutions participated and 26 ordinary citizens. 
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Table 4. Respondent’s Responses on Electricity Prices as of 2019 n=48 
n (6) % n (16) % n (26) % n (48) %
High 1 16.7 11 69 21 80.8 33 69
Medium 5 83.3 5 31 3 11.5 13 27
Low 0 0 0 0 2 7.7 2 4
Don’t Know 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 6 100.0 16 100.0 26 100.00 48 100.0
IPPs  Public and Private Institutions Citizens Total
 
Source: Field Data, (2018/ 2019) 
 
Analysis of the study findings on Table 4 indicate that 33(69%) of the 
respondents commented that electricity price is high. 13(27%) agree that 
electricity price is medium while 2 (9.1) had the observation that electricity 
price is low. In terms of categories of the respondents 5(83.3%) out of six 
respondents from IPPs said the price was medium and from the group of 
public and private institutions about 11(69) respondents had the opinion 
that electricity price was high while the group of citizens 21(80%) 
concluded that electricity price was high. The results implies that 
respondents had conflict of interest. Respondents from power users 
comment that the price are high while this observation was contrary to 
respondents from IPPs who argued that the price were medium. During a 
one to one interview session with one respondent neighboring Songas 
Limited it was revealed that one of the main challenges facing consumers 
was high electricity cost from producers.  Quoting his own words he 
remarked that: 
“The cost of electricity is high compared to the uses of one unit. I 
suggest there should be more investors other than TANESCO to 
improve the situation. (Interview Session Number 10 on 16/11/2018 in 
DSM).      
In supporting this another resident of Mbuyuni neighboring TPC 
Limited remarked that:  
“The electricity cost is high as I buy electricity from TANESCO. The 
amount of units received is small compared to the amount of money I 
pay and imagine the economic situation now days”. I participate in 
planting trees and conserve water sources”. (Interview Session 
Number 9 conducted on 6/3/2019 in Dar es Salaam). 
For a country like Tanzania whose economic development is still low, its 
citizens have no capacity to buy electricity at such a high price. It is against 
this background that TANESCO and the government at large have always 
been in bargains with private power investors to ensure that electricity is 
available at a reasonable price to low customers.  
 
6.4. Factors influencing performance of PPPs projects in power 
sector 
Compliance and Commitment: Respondents showed that the rights and 
obligation of each participating partners in contractual arrangement was 
partially fulfilled. They mentioned that the government through TANESCO 
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was responsible for buying and paying the generated and sold electricity 
and the private produce whose basic major obligation was to offer the 
generated electricity as needed. However, this study noted that the 
problem was on lack of timely payment of electricity bill as per PPPs.  
 The findings of this study indicated that TANESCO was selling 
electricity to customers and collecting bills for repayment to the IPPs. It was 
argued that the Single buyer model applied in selling the generated 
electricity was not sufficient as limited competition and it encouraged state 
monopolist tendencies in the sector. The research findings showed that 
payment among IPPs and TANESCO were problematic. Respondents 
revealed that TANESCO was failing to pay the bills timely hence 
suffocating the plants that were required to repay the loans from 
commercial banks and pay salaries to the staff.  To address this problem, it 
was suggested that compliance and commitment should be effectively 
regulated by the independent power regulator in the country that oversees 
the performance of the power plants and bill repayment status as per PPA. 
This finding is consistent with Farlam (2005) who conducted a study to 
assess Public-Private Partnerships in Gabon and who reported that 
defining investment obligations help to limit the investment risk of the 
private operator. 
Quality and sufficiency of Contracts: Farlam (2005), Gratwick et. al., (2007); 
Kabendera & Anderson (2014), criticized IPPs performance with the 
argument that, the contracts were skewed in favor of power producers at 
the expense of government and consumers. Weaknesses in due diligence 
during the procurement and negotiation of PPAs have led to long and 
controversial legal disputes that incurred significant indirect costs, as well 
as blemished from the public perception of private investment in electricity 
projects. During the interview, It was raised that challenge to effective 
performance of electricity generation investment is the unsatisfactory 
contracts entered between two parties particularly in the price of selling 
electricity. Regarding this scenario, one of the respondent’s notes: 
 “The results of poor performance has been caused by poor 
management System and contracts are not favorable to the 
government. (Interview Session Number 5 conducted on 19/11/2019 in 
Dodoma) 
This is in line with the argument by Gratwick, Ghanandan & Eberhard, 
(2006) that PPP contracts being undertaken through concessional 
agreement for electricity generation projects did not produced the expected 
role of private sector in generating adequate, cost effective, reliable 
electricity.  
Capacity charges: During the interview, It was raised that capacity 
charges has been the major issue in complicating performance of electricity 
generation deals. While public officials complained on capacity charges 
from Independent power producers, the officials from the Independent 
power producers had different views protecting their interest in favor of 
capacity charges. This argument implies that, IPPs major objectives is to 
Journal of Social and Administrative Sciences 
 E.M. Kanyamyoga, JSAS, 7(2), 2020, p.70-95. 
87 
87 
make profit by making sure that its funds will be paid back over time plus 
a reasonable return on that investment. In Tanzania these charges are 
negotiated and agreed by TANESCO and also have to be approved by the 
Electricity and Water Regulating Authority. The findings are in line with 
Lovei, (2000) argument that, decisions about adding generation capacity 
are made by government officials who do not have to bear the financial 
consequences of their actions.  
Hydrological Uncertainties: Environment issues pertaining to sharp 
decline in water levels during dry seasons was a big challenge to the 
performance of power producers who depended on hydroelectricity.  It 
was noted that generation was high during wet and high rainfall season 
and it  was  low during dry  seasons when  the  volume of  water was  low. 
The researcher found that there was no water gauge to project the water 
behaviour of the rivers used for electricity generation. Based on the 
findings, it is true that electricity from hydro-power plants is limited by 
environment conditions such as droughts and human activities. The 
findings of this study are in line with Salifu (2015) who indicated, 
Hydrological uncertainties were challenges to partnerships in electricity 
generation in Ghana. 
Robust and Inclusive Policies, Laws, Regulatory and Institutional Frameworks: 
The National Energy Policy (NEP), (2015) states the main issues pertaining 
to electricity generation is sufficient power for domestic market and 
participation in cross border trading. The policy statement shows that the 
government shall ensure that there is cost reflective tariff to attract private 
investments; ensure effective use of energy resources; facilitate cross border 
power trading and create enabling environment for nuclear electricity 
generation. However, the research findings from the selected private power 
producers showed that realities in functioning of PPPs in electricity 
generation did not match with the policy statements. It was noted that 
delays and self-interest among public officials was one of the causes of poor 
performance and application of PPP projects in energy generation. For 
instance, it was observed that the process of getting approval and licence to 
develop new investments was taking too long. It was revealed that 
respondents noted turnaround times in the licensing and generation tariff 
approval process in different government institutions. This finding is in 
line with Akampurira & Shakantu (2008) who noted critical challenges in 
the development of PPPs including lack of smooth approvals of different 
steps required to set up power generation plants in Uganda. This was 
exacerbated by weak and unresponsive bureaucratic nature of institutions 
thus causing delays, prompted by poor coordination among government 
departments. This observation is consistent with literature on the 
development of an IPP where legal and institutional support is critical.  On 
this particular issue, Minizela (2016), argues that the licensing and 
permitting stage which is dictated by policy and the legal framework 
government support is of essence to the application of PPP projects. 
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Fair Competition and Transparency: The PPP Act (2014) provides for 
competition for both solicited and unsolicited proposals although it 
provides some rooms for some projects for the national interests when 
things like security are a big concern. It was found that regulation of IPPs 
transactions is made by the Underlying Power Purchase Agreement (PPA). 
This models has been challenge in Colverson and Perera, (2012) that project 
transparency is weakened under the PPP model because of the difficultly in 
accessing private sector information.  It this view it requires contracting 
authorities to implement the principles of fairness, equitability, 
transparency, competitiveness, cost effectiveness, atmost duedelligence in 
procuring power generation companies. 
 
6.5. Strategies for improving power sector performance  
Respondents were asked to suggest strategies for improving 
performance of the existing models used for electricity generation for 
improving power sector performance in an open-ended question. Table 5 
presents respondents the responses on proposed strategies.   
   
Table 5. Strategies for Improving Power Sector Performance n =22 
n (6) % n (16) % n (22) %
Political will 0 0 2 12.5 2 9
Timely payment of electricity bill from 
offtaker
3 50 0 0 3 14
Appropriate risk allocation and 
management
0 0 1 6.3 1 5
Commitment to contracts 2 33.3 3 18.8 5 23
Adequate financial and managerial 
capacity
0 0 1 6.3 1 5
Development and use of Local content 0 0 1 6.3 1 5
Policy, legal, and institution support 0 0 2 12.5 2 9
Fair and transparent bidding process 0 0 2 12.5 2 9
Increase goverment spending in 
electrcity
0 0 2 12.5 2 9
Debundling of the sector 1 16.7 2 12.5 3 14
Total 6 100.0 16 100.0 22 100.0
IPPs  Public and Private Institutions Total
 
Source: Field Data, (2018/2019) 
 
The analysis of the data generated from questionnaires administered to 
22 respondents revealed that 5 (23%) of them explained that there should 
be commitment to contracts, 3 (14%) of the respondents thought that  there 
should be timely payment of electricity bills from off taker and again 3(14) 
respondents observed that there is a  need to unbundling the sector. 
Furthermore, 2(9%) was scored by each point namely political will, policy, 
legal, and institution support, fair and transparent bidding process, 
increase government spending in electricity generation. Other points that 
emerged and scored 1(5%) each were appropriate risk allocation and 
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management, adequate financial and managerial capacity, development 
and use of local content. 
Regarding this, Benges et. al. (2016) argue that, it is worth noting that the 
existence and arrangement of PPP institutional and regulatory frameworks 
are adequate to create an enabling environment to support and attract 
private sector participation in the PPP projects.  This finding agrees with 
OECD, (2012) which indicates that at all stages of the PPP process, there 
must be strong institutions characterised by a clear legal framework that 
both public and private parties trust. Clarity in the regulatory framework 
will also help minimize the risk of corruption and prevent unethical 
behaviour. Nijkamp et. al., (2002) argued that in the model of public private 
partnership, each partnership contributes to the partnership. Therefore PPP 
is built on “the expertise of each partner that best meets clearly the defined 
public needs through the most appropriate allocation of resources, risks 
responsibilities and rewards. Here the public sector maintains an oversight 
and quality assessment roles while the private is more closely involved in 
actually delivered (financing), operating, maintaining, etc) the public good 
or services (World Bank, 2000). 
 
7. New proposed PPPs model for improving electricity 
generation 
In line with theoretical framework (institutional theory and theory of 
collaborative advantage), the proposed model specification is in tandem 
with the themes as emerged from the respondent’s questionnaires, 
interviews, field observations and documentary analysis which allows for 
the identification of the determinants of effective public-private partnership 
model between independent power producers and TANESCO. The model 
aims to meet the overall objective of the study which was to examine the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for enhancing Public–Private 
Partnership models between Independent Power Producers and TANESCO 
for improving electricity generation in Tanzania. The model specification 
thus borrows from Jamilatu (2015), and Ubi et. al., (2012) as follows: 
 
The proposed model begins with the model specification    
 
Y = f (X)          (1) 
 
 Y = Effectiveness of partnerships  
 X = Determinants of partnerships functioning. 
 Effectiveness of partnerships as an independent variable is measured by 
national goal of expanding electricity generation to 10,000 by 2025. Thus, to 
achieve this goal comes the determinants partnership functioning as the 
explanatory variables. 
Thus, the model specification is developed as follows: 
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EGt = F (GPSt, TECHt, CONTt, FINt, EPt, INSt, GOVt, QPPst; RAMt)  (2) 
 
In stochastic form, the above model can be expressed as: 
 
EGt = β0 + β1GPSt + β2TECHt +β3CONTt + β4FINt + β5EPt + β6INSt + 
β7GOVt + β8QPPt +β9RAMt + εt       (3) 
 
Where: 
GPS - Government and private spending on electricity   
TECH - Technology  
CONT - Quality and sufficient contracts and its enforcement 
FIN - Financial support and management capability  
EP - Electricity price per megawatt hours  
INS - Robust and inclusive political, economic & social institutions 
GOV - Quality of governance structures, laws, regulations & policies 
QPP- Quality of Independent Power Producers 
RAM - Risk allocation and management 
GPS; TECH; CONT; FIN; EP; INS; GOV; QPP; RAM; are explanatory 
variables, while εt is the stochastic disturbance term at time t.  
 
The argument here is that PPPs models for electricity generation are 
influenced by the public sector that controls the decision-making 
structures, the political and social goals while the private sector contributes 
to the process by its innovation capabilities, knowledge, technology, 
management, funds and networks. Stakeholders in the other side include 
civil society, financiers, faith-based organizations and local communities 
living along power plants. These have a significant contribution for 
enhancing effective PPPs models in the energy sector. 
The national energy policy addresses the government’s increasing 
involvement in developing electricity sector including cost effective, 
adequate and reliable electricity for the national development. Private 
interests are mainly for profit earning than being society oriented.  
Therefore, to create a meaningful PPP model, the Public and private sectors 
should align their interest for effective functioning of PPPs models. It is 
said that “You always get what you negotiate and not what you deserve.” 
Therefore, balancing these two conflicting interests requires a 
comprehensive policy, legal regulatory and institutional frameworks to 
negotiate win-win outcome.  Given this context then, the government must 
ensure that the system is properly regulated. In operationalizing the 
proposed models, it is the author observation that private, public and other 
stakeholders have significant contribution in achieving the common motive 
of improved electricity generation. However, the PPPs model’s functions 
are negotiated depending on status of the state if it is developmental state, 
laissez-faire or predatory state (Evans, 1989). 
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Supportive policies, laws, legal and regulatory framework are of essence 
in the application and implementation of PPP in energy projects. There are 
policies such as PPP policy 2010, Energy Policy 2015, and Investment Policy 
1996 to mention but few. These policies are not specific for PPPs in 
electricity generation projects rather, they are general and have not been  
properly  implemented even  for  the   purposes  which  they  were  set  for . 
For example, the Energy Policy 2015 as such has not been reviewed and 
updated to accommodate the changing macroeconomic contexts and other 
sector changes both national and global. Therefore, the policy should define 
long term vision and strategy and secure high level political support. The 
legal and regulatory environment should show clear legal basis, dispute 
resolution mechanism, procurement rules and fair transparent and 
competitive process. 
Therefore, clear institutional frameworks should be in best operational 
capacity. This implies having clear allocation of responsibilities and 
autonomy of the existing institutional. The demarcation to who is 
approving what and who is in charge of promotion PPP projects, adhering 
to regulations during implementation and where the expertise is located in 
the government are all what are needed. The investment and PPP issues are 
placed under different government departments that cause long 
investment process and bureaucracy. In the PPP arrangement for energy 
generation, each partner has one’s own motive but in any case, 
effectiveness lies in win-win PPA/SPPAs contracts. To achieve such 
contracts, there should be adequate transparency in contract and 
procurement of PPPs and a comprehensive technical analysis of PPP as 
well as sufficient capacity of negotiation among partnering parties. 
Monitoring and evaluation of electricity generation projects should be 
done time involving team work from both partnering parties with the aim 
of coming up with necessary review and flexibility in the implementation 
of the PPPs projects. If gaps are identified, there should be working 
towards harmonizing them as a way of improving o the existing PPP 
structures and creating an enabling environment. The PPPs and investment 
issues should be placed at one umbrella such as PPPs centre. It should be 
noted that energy infrastructure projects require huge capital for 
investment that most local commercial banks at present are unable to give.  
Therefore,  to address these financial woes in the energy sector, electricity 
infrastructure development bank should be established since energy 
infrastructure projects have long life spans and require long term financial 
support which can only be secured sufficiently and reliably from strong 
and purposefully established bank. 
Opening up competition and unbundling the sector is necessary for 
effective implementation and application of electricity generation projects. 
Regarding this, Oriakhi & Okoh (2007) noted that countries such as 
Argentina, Chile, Malaysia, Philippine, Hungary, Latria, Gabon, Cote 
d’ivoire etc. have introduced competitive and private participation in 
infrastructure development unlike in  the  past governments which  were  
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characterized  by  monopolistic  national  power  utilities. With this new 
direction, the study noted that the results have been encouraging. 
 With this proposed PPP model, the services should be seen as a 
commodity and other utility and services providers should compete for 
services provision and therefore doing away with the monopoly of state 
sponsored  energy  utilities.  This study notes that given that competition 
has been successful in the telecommunication sector, it is therefore 
optimistic that this would be the benchmark for unbundling the electricity 
sector. Therefore, stakeholders’ involvement in PPPs projects should be 
enhanced to allow the public and experts to scrutiny the pros and cons of 
the ongoing projects. Likewise, the parliament as a powerful legislature 
organ will have the opportunity to debate the contracts signed. But this 
should be done transparently by involving all stakeholders with both direct 
and indirect interests such as donors and the communication sector in 
respective locations whose input is critical for the purpose of enlisting 
support and preparedness to change. 
 There should also be enhancing of strong internal arbitration institution 
instead of depending on external ICD. There should also be opting for 
introduction arbitration subsidiary of the ICD in East Africa region for 
PPPs dispute settlement. Fair and transparent bidding process for PPAs 
should also form part of   such body’s functions as it should   be noted, of 
the near past,, independent power producers were not obtained through 
transparent and competitive bidding. There should be competition system 
in getting potential investors and the government should issue indicative 
prices that will make electricity generation attractive or benefiting to both 
parties hence leading to fair and transparent bidding process. Another 
thing that the suggested model embraces is the importance of building 
capacity to local private investors. It was noted through the findings that 
local firms with a potential for producing electricity have not been engaged 
in the energy investment sector. Therefore, the model sees that there is a 
need for the government to enhance or  build  their   low energy cost due to 
low investment costs  that  they  will  have  uncured  in the  process  of  
investing  given  the   capacity  building  they  might  have  received  
including  the use of local content and personnel. Domestic capital is 
optionally cheaper and easier to secure than foreign capital and local 
investors have a better understanding of country risk and more avenues to 
navigate the potential setbacks. Thus the use of high quality foreign and 
domestic Independent Power Producers in financing electricity generation 
projects could lower the overall costs involved. To realize this, education 
about energy infrastructure and its potential should be given to investors 
and in the process, a financial package on projects exemptions be 
introduced. 
 There should also be building capacity on human, financial and 
technology dimensions for practitioners in terms of introducing sound 
management principles and sufficient capacity of negotiations and 
procurement of PPPs. For financial capacity building, the state utility 
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should allow escrow arrangement, use of blended finance such as 
concessional, grant and government support. The technical technology 
development and skills levels will facilitate the initiation and hence 
guarantee effective implementation of PPP in the energy generation. 
The government should ensure value for money for all PPP projects that 
is, making that these are guided by value for money and not for profit 
making alone. Also there should be promotion of the uptake of renewable 
energy projects in remote areas and considering of consumers’ welfare. 
Again, the issues of fair allocation of risks and profits should be adhered to 
in the contractual agreement by making sure that each party is part of risks 
and profits. This should reflect also transparent and predictable contracts 
for partners and contract flexibility. With regard to political commitment 
on energy generation projects; the government should ensure there is 
political will and commitment and proper implementation of policies in 
order to allow the partnership operate in an environment that is acceptable 
by both partners in order to encourage private participation. It is envisaged 
by the proposed model that the government’s preparedness in terms of 
political will and willingness to accommodate the private sector’s 
participation in energy sector will promote further investment in new 
energy generation projects. However, there is need for government to 
exercise sufficient political control in a bid to encourage private sector 
participation in the provision of public services and to ensure that the 
needed operational environment is put in place.  Similarly, the government 
should be well prepared andle to handle the public perception and social 
and cultural issues that affect the manner in which a public private 
partnership is likely to be implemented. 
Finally, according to the proposed model, there is a need to provide an 
environment that ensures sustainable recovery of project costs, affordable 
prices and tariff for investors that implement PPP pricing framework for 
suitable and sustainable pricing instruments. This will entail extending 
special incentives for attracting electricity developers willing to open new 
energy generation sites to geographical and economically disadvantage 
marginal areas. This would attract the private sector to invest in those areas 
which before had no electricity services therefore complementing the 
electricity supply by TANESCO. 
 
8. Conclusion 
The potential of private sector (innovation finance technology and 
managerial skills) and participation through PPPs in electricity sub sector 
have not been fully realized in Tanzania. Despite the fact that government 
policies, law regulations and institutions have been put in place for 
attracting private sector as a viable option for promoting efficient public 
services delivery in Tanzania’s power sector, these efforts have not 
produced best outcomes. It has been further revealed that implementation 
of PPPs in energy generation projects has  been   hindered by key elements 
such as unpredictable payments guarantee, skewed contract for 
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PPAs/SPPAs, lack of transparency and fair competition, high cost of 
electricity, unpredictable electricity demand and supply from the  off taker, 
unpredictable electricity selling price, policy and managerial inconsistency, 
poor compliance and commitment contracts, corruption, policies, wind fall 
profits from power developers, lack of PPP skills to oversee PPP 
transaction, state utility monopoly, bureaucracy, weak institutional support 
and lack of  sufficient resources dedicated to fostering PPP. However, this 
research argues that any model of PPPs engaging independent power 
projects can contribute to improving electricity services delivery and 
livelihood only if is competitively and transparently negotiations within 
effective planning and regulatory system. On the contrary, weak capacity 
of state institutions will result in blood sucking contracts that are lopsided, 
exploitative and unsustainable. Therefore, effective PPP models 
functioning under developmental state with boost policies, institutional 
rules and regulations and well-focused achievable development goals will 
reap benefits of innovation, technology, managerial skills and private 
financing.  
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